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ABSTRACT
Since the triple crises of food, fuel and finance of 2007/8,
investments in agricultural growth corridors have taken centre-
stage in government, donor and private sector initiatives. This
article examines the politics of the multi-billion dollar
development of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of
Tanzania (SAGCOT). The corridor’s proponents aim to create an
environment in which agribusiness will operate alongside
smallholders to improve food security and environmental
sustainability, while reducing rural poverty. Based on three
case studies, comprising one of a small-scale dairy company
and two large-scale sugar companies, all operating with
smallholders, this paper interrogates the political dynamics that
shape the implementation of SAGCOT on the ground; in particular,
the multiple contestations among bureaucrats, investors and
smallholders over access to land and other resources, and
contending visions for agricultural commercialisation. Despite
the widespread support it received from government, donors
and investors, the paper argues that SAGCOT’s grand modernist
vision of the corridor, centred on the promotion of large-scale
estates, has unravelled through contestations and negotiations
on the ground.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 16 April 2019







Agricultural growth corridors have a long history in Africa, linked to colonial planning,
the promotion of growth poles and spatial development.1 While in the past, corridors
were mostly state-led, contemporary investments are often driven by state-capital alli-
ances, supported by donor finance – as is evident in the case of the Southern Agricultural
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) launched at the World Economic Forum Africa
held in Dar Es Saalaam, Tanzania in 2010.2 Initially, the key driving force behind
SAGCOT’s implementation was the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, com-
monly known as the New Alliance, an initiative launched in May 2012 by the Heads of G8
countries in collaboration with six heads of African states.3 It aimed to foster private sector
and development partners’ investment in African agriculture and lift 50 million people out
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of poverty by 2022.4 The implementation of SAGCOT was further aligned with that of the
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme’s (CAADP) Maputo
Declaration – Africa’s policy framework for agricultural transformation, wealth creation,
food security and nutrition, economic growth and prosperity.5
These regional and international initiatives provide a platform to galvanise global inves-
tors, multi-national companies, international aid donors, state bureaucrats and politicians
in a grand modernist vision for the transformation of agriculture.6 Both local and national
elites have welcomed large-scale initiatives by foreign and national capital because they
create opportunities for rent-seeking and direct engagement through lease agreements
and/or directly accumulating land.7 In the implementation of SAGCOT, many competing
interests collide, resulting in sustained contestation over both the overall vision, and the
practical implementation of investment projects on the ground. Based on the exploration
of three case studies, examined during fieldwork in 2017–18, this paper investigates the
dynamics of this process, exploring the politics of contestation8 at the centre of corri-
dor-making. An examination of the interests of different actors situates the analysis in a
broad agrarian political economy analysis that asks: ‘Who owns what? Who does what?
Who gets what? And what do they do with it?’.9
Over time, configurations of interests change, as projects shift during implementation.
The paper examines the consequences of this for different actors, unpacking the actions of
the state, government bureaucrats and the diverse rural smallholders with whom they
interact. This suggests a focus on the micro-politics of corridor implementation, uncover-
ing the contests and contradictions that emerge as state authority and the power of capital
are challenged.10 These unfolding dynamics reveal different trajectories of social differen-
tiation and accumulation, with winners and losers emerging from corridor-making; even
when plans change and implementation is at best partial.
In particular, the paper highlights how the original plans for large-scale estate invest-
ments have changed towards a greater focus on outgrower schemes. A number of com-
mentators have raised the question of how and on what terms smallholders are
incorporated into these investment plans, especially through outgrowing schemes.11 Agri-
cultural growth corridors, such as SAGCOT, apart from being investments in agricultural
commericalisation in a geographical area, alongside investment in key transport infra-
structure, including railways and roads,12 they are also political constructs that are
largely subject to national and local political dynamics. Tanzania has a long history of
state-led large-scale agricultural investments, from the colonial ‘groundnut scheme’ in
central Tanzania13 to independent Tanzania’s wheat and livestock schemes, which have
either failed or never met their targets.14 SAGCOT is somewhat different because of its
scale (see Figure 1) and because it is led by both public and private sector actors, each
with competing visions and interests. Located in a wider, global political economy of
investment following the financial crisis of 2008, SAGCOT represents an important
case study of what some have described as externally-driven ‘land grabbing’.15
However, the story is more complex in practice than the simple ‘land grabbing’ narra-
tive. Outcomes on the ground emerge from complex, site-specific negotiations among
diverse actors. Despite being framed as high-modernist, top-down approaches,16 giving
opportunities for private capital and for rent-seeking on the part of politicians and
senior bureaucrats, little investment has been seen on the ground. The slow implemen-
tation of SAGCOT is the result of changing priorities among the ruling elites. For
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example, while the previous government of President Jakaya Kikwete prioritised agricul-
ture and formulated various initiatives, the current government of President John Magu-
fuli focuses more on an industrialisation agenda.17 In addition, local dynamics – such as
the role of an active civil society and arrangements around land-rights that promote the
interests of smallholders – have produced complex and varied outcomes. These dynamics
foreground the importance of a political economy approach in understanding the politics
of corridor-making, where particular attention is placed on the variegated interests, prac-
tices and outcomes in particular sites of investment.
These themes emerge from three case studies within the corridor. These are the Kilo-
mbero Sugar Company Limited, the largest sugar producing company in Tanzania, largely
owned by Associated British Foods plc; Mkulazi Holding Company Limited (MHCL), a
joint venture of the two Tanzanian pension funds; and Njombe Milk Factory, whose
largest shareholder is a milk producers’ cooperative society. All three companies
operate with outgrowers. The case studies were purposely selected to uncover diverse
characteristics of ongoing investments within the corridor.
The article draws on intensive field research carried out between October 2017 and
September 2018, with 65 key informant interviews, and six focus group discussions.
Figure 1. The map of Tanzania showing SAGCOT area.
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Four discussions were held in Kilombero and one each at Njombe and Mkulazi. Key infor-
mants were drawn from farmers’ groups, women’s groups, the Sugar Board of Tanzania
(SBT), regional and district officials, company representatives, civil society organisations,
researchers and academics. In each site the aim was to draw out the dynamics of contesta-
tion and the role of different interest groups in the context of understanding how the
different investments played out through the implementation process.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section introduces the histories, narratives and
imaginaries of SAGCOT. It examines the main agricultural commercialisation models pro-
moted across the corridor and identifies the main actors. This is followed by the analysis of
the three contrasting case studies. The paper then discusses ongoing contestations and nego-
tiations around corridor-making on the ground, revealing compromises and shifting pos-
itions. This allows an analysis of SAGCOT’s changing focus, the implications for different
actors and explores what the corridor means in practice. The article concludes that the
high-modernist vision of SAGCOT promoted by its state-capital alliance proponents is com-
plicated and reshaped by national and local politics in the process of corridor-making.18
SAGCOT: history, narratives and imaginaries
SAGCOT is the first initiative in contemporary Tanzania to set ambitious targets for large-
scale agricultural plantations and ranches through private sector agricultural investment.
Launched in May 2010, SAGCOT is touted as the ‘Kilimo Kwanza’ [Agriculture First]
slogan in action. Kilimo Kwanza itself is an initiative articulated by the Tanzania National
Business Council (TNBC) in 2009, which has the overarching objective of transforming
agriculture through enhanced productivity. TNBC is co-chaired by the President of the
United Republic of Tanzania and the President of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation.
The area labelled as the corridor initiative covers about a third of mainland Tanzania.19
The area lies alongside Tanzania’s central railway, power backbone and a highway that
runs from the port of Dar Es Salaam to the country’s border posts with the Democractic
Republic of Congo, Malawi and Zambia (see Figure 1).
SAGCOT was first promoted by Yara, a Norwegian fertiliser company, as part of an
initiative to popularise agricultural growth corridors.20 Yara presented its idea at the
UN General Assembly in 2008 and later at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2009
in Switzerland.21 SAGCOT enjoys widespread support from state and private actors,
and regional and international organisations. It aims to produce ‘inclusive, commercially
successful agribusinesses that will benefit the region’s small-scale farmers, and in so doing,
improve food security, reduce rural poverty and ensure environmental sustainability.’22
Supporters include the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), bilateral develop-
ment agencies, financial institutions, such as the World Bank, and domestic banks, along
with the domestic, regional and international private sector, dominated by the multina-
tional corporations dealing with fertiliser and seed production and supply.23
Currently, SAGCOT’s plans have merged with those of domestic, regional and inter-
national initiatives such as Kilimo Kwanza, CAADP and the New Alliance. One of the
ten pillars of Kilimo Kwanza is to make land policy and other legislative reforms in Tan-
zania. Private sector actors have argued that accessing land, particularly village land,24 is
extremely difficult. Under the proposed National Land Policy, the government plans to set
aside land for large-scale investments. However, since the change of government and the
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leadership of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the party in power following the 2015
general election, there have been a number of changes in policy priorities and allocation
of resources. In turn, such changes have had impacts on donors and investors’ views of the
country’s business and investment environment.25
There is a significant difference between the current government priorities and policy
approaches compared to the previous government under President Kikwete, which had
ushered in initiatives to boost private sector investments in agriculture as demonstrated
in both Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT. Unlike Kikwete’s government, President Magu-
fuli’s government has emphasised a strong state presence in all sectors. According
media reports and other outlets such as Africa Confidential, it is widely reported that
the head of the Matching Grant Facility, Thomas Herlehy, who resigned in January
2019, made it clear that the government of Tanzania was not ready to issue matching
grants to private agribusinesses and it issued the request to amend the agreement in
2018.26 The government has argued that if it were to issue such support to private agri-
businesses, it should be in the form of a loan instead of a grant and that at some point
in the future, infrastructure developed by such agribusinesses should be transferred to
local district authorities which will hold them on behalf of smallholders. However, anec-
dotally, the current government appears to object that some of the investments ear-
marked to receive matching grants were either wholly or partially owned by foreign
private entities and or individuals. Moreover, the Minister of Agriculture and Coopera-
tives emphasised the government’s decision to withdraw from its previous commitments
on SAGCOT, stating that ‘[i]mplementing the project that had been delayed for more
than three years would be of no benefit. We have therefore decided to review it to
suit our present environment’.27
Despite these significant national political factors, SAGCOT’s development was heavily
influenced by the wider global financial crisis from 2008.28 For example, hedge funds and
social security funds are heavily invested in SAGCOT.29 Investments in agricultural land
in developing countries are viewed as a way to generate greater returns than had been
available in stagnating Western economies. Indeed, unlike Kenya’s Lamu Port, South
Sudan and Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor,30 which was designed by state
bureaucrats, SAGCOT’s blueprint was drawn up by private consulting companies,
namely Prorustica and AgDevCo from the United Kingdom, which have also been
involved in the design of Mozambique’s Beira Corridor.31 Since its inception in 2010,
SAGCOT has attracted many domestic and international private investors. SAGCOT’s
blueprint states that, in over 20 years, it will invest about $1.3 billion emanating from gov-
ernment and donor partners in order to attract $2.1 billion from local and international
private investors.32
Currently, within SAGCOT, two main forms of agricultural investment are in place.
The first involves the acquisition of land rights, often through long-term leases or conces-
sions for either nucleus estates or plantations.33 In some areas, large-scale land acqui-
sitions associated with direct or indirect displacement of rural communities have been
reported, for example in Songea and Rufiji districts – both of which are located within pro-
posed SAGCOT clusters.34 The second involves a variety of arrangements (outgrowing
and contract farming) between small-, medium- and large-scale producers and/or pro-
cessors.35 The two forms of investment have differentiated impacts on rural livelihoods,
land rights and the country’s economy at large.36
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The government promotes a modernisation vision for the corridor. The 2013 National
Agricutural Policy, for instance, states that the government considers SAGCOT as an
important means of attaining its aim ‘to bring about a green revolution that entails trans-
formation of agriculture from subsistence farming towards commercialization and mod-
ernization.’37 Smallholder farmers are incorporated into mainstream commercial
agribusiness through contract farming and outgrower schemes.38 Within SAGCOT, the
government and its partners aim to
bring 350,000 hectares of land into profitable production, transition 100,000 small-scale farmers
into commercial farming, create 420,000 new employment opportunities, lift twomillion people
out of poverty, and generate 1.2 billion dollars in annual farming revenue by 2030.39
The SAGCOT blueprint, however, notes the constraints to investment due to high risk,
and recommends reducing anticipated costs and risks for investors.40 To minimise inves-
tors’ costs in the early stages of their investment, the blueprint proposes to grant soft loans
to local investors that intend to partner with smallholder farmers and outgrowers in the
corridor area.41 Hence, SAGCOT established a ‘Catalytic Fund’, with funds extended to
the agribusinesses that incorporate smallholder farmers in their value chains.42 Following
some delays, in March 2016, the World Bank approved $70 million in new financing ‘to
support Tanzania’s agriculture sector and strengthen it by linking smallholder farmers to
agribusinesses for boosting incomes and job-led growth’,43 with funding directed towards
implementing SAGCOT. InMay 2019, the government withdrew from its financing agree-
ment with the World Bank. SAGCOT related businesses (established before or after the
formal launch) continue to operate. Nonetheless, the secretariat and the corridor’s propo-
nents will likely need to turn to other financiers and donors to sustain it.44
SAGCOT initiatives did not start from scratch as some commentators have suggested,45
but often rather build on existing projects. Its blueprint states that it
aims to facilitate the development of clusters of profitable agricultural businesses within the
southern corridor. Building on existing operations and planned investments, the clusters are
likely to bring together agricultural research stations, nucleus larger farms and ranches with
outgrower schemes, irrigated block farming operations, processing and storage facilities,
transport and logistics hubs, and improved ‘last mile’ infrastructure to farms and local
communities.46
While guided by investment frameworks, plans, and regulations, SAGCOT in practice is
implemented through particular agricultural investment projects. These differ in scale and
consequence. In the next section, three case studies are discussed; they are drawn from
three clusters (see Figure 2) carefully selected to represent different business models,
and types of investors and shareholders. The study explored the terms of incoporation
of smallholders in the projects, the way the projects have been negotiated and re-nego-
tiated on the ground through the playing out of contentious politics47 among different
interest groups and how, in practice, diverse impacts emerge, with different pathways of
agricultural commercialisation being promoted under SAGCOT.
Case studies
This section explores the characteristics of each of the three selected investment projects (see
Figure 3), asking who are the investors, who gains and who loses from such investments,
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how the investment was designed, and its impacts on land rights, and the outcomes of these
investments. The study also explored how the implementation of each of the selected invest-
ment project shaped local politics and, in turn, how such project plans have changed
through implementation, as a result of local and national level contestations.
Figure 2. The map of six clusters of SAGCOT.
Figure 3. The three case study sites within SAGCOT region.
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Kilombero Sugar Company Limited
The Kilombero Sugar Company Limited (KSCL) is often referred to as a ‘success story’ in
Tanzania’s sugar sector.48 The company was recently accepted as a SAGCOT member49
and its model, which combines estate and outgrower production, is set to be replicated
in the SAGCOT to foster increased sugarcane production with outgrowers as a core com-
ponent.50 As noted earlier, not all investments under SAGCOT are new. For example,
KSCL established its first factory in Msolwa area in the 1960s.51 It was funded by the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Standard
Bank and two Dutch financial organisations. KSCL was nationalised in 1967 after the
implementation of the Arusha Declaration, which saw the government retaking manage-
ment of industries of high economic value. The company was later privatised in 1998, with
55% of the shares sold to the South African Company, Illovo Sugar Group. Illovo Group is
currently fully owned by Associated British Foods Plc. The government has maintained
25% shares in KSCL; the remainder of the shares are owned by ED&FMan, a British com-
modity trader.52 From its inception, the company worked with outgrowers, leasing about
9,562 ha from the central government, 8,000 ha of which is under sugarcane, with the
remaining land used for factories, offices, staff houses and social amenities. The
company runs two sugarcane crushing and processing facilities in its compound.53
The company engages with outgrowers through a Cane Supply Agreement (CSA),
which stipulates the division of proceeds between the company and the outgrowers.
There are about 8,500 registered outgrowers supplying about 45% of total sugarcane pro-
cessed by the company.54 As of 2017/18 the outgrowers received TZS 103,000 ($44.50) per
tonne of delivered fresh sugarcane, before adjustments for sucrose levels and actual sales
are made. Once all the processed sugar is sold, the company and outgrowers share their
proceeds at a rate of 40% for outgrowers and 60% for the company because the
company on its own produced more cane than outgrowers.55
Both key informant interviews and focus group discussions with sugarcane farmers
highlighted that the amount of cash revenue received from both the fresh sugarcane deliv-
ered and the final proceeds vary from one outgrower to the other. Sugarcane with a high
sucrose level receives a higher price, but for decades, farmers have complained about lack
of transparency on how their delivered sugarcane is weighed and the sucrose level is deter-
mined by company staff. Allegations of corruption against the staff are also well documen-
ted.56 The lack of transparency remains a key source of contestation between outgrowers
and staff.
In a focus group discussion, members of the Msolwa Agricultural and Marketing Coop-
erative Society (AMCOS), previously known as Msolwa outgrowers association, who
supply sugarcane to KSCL, explained that the company is the sole judge of the quality
of sugarcane that farmers deliver to its factories. They insisted that outgrowers receive
less money than they feel they are entitled to because the company often claims that
they deliver sugarcane that has overstayed (i.e. more than 72 h since it was burned).57
As a result of this combination of factors, there are mixed impacts of sugarcane farming
at the household level. Despite increased sugarcane production in Kilombero over time,
few families have diversified their economic activities.58 Families that wholly depend on
sugarcane production remain vulnerable to many other potential risks such as price fluctu-
ations, low records of sucrose levels for sugarcane delivered to the company, and the
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recorded weight of tonnage delivered.59 Opportunities for employment have changed too,
with declining permanent employment in the estate/processing plants, especially for
women.60
Land relations, market dynamics and processes of local land privatisation
Sugarcane production in Kilombero Valley is a lucrative business attracting wealthy indi-
viduals who are currently taking advantage of other businesses associated with cane pro-
duction, such as cane loading and transportation.61 In the focus group discussions, it was
pointed out that another consequence of sugarcane mono-cropping is the declining land
area for food production, which is forcing poor families to commute from their sugarcane-
producing villages, sometimes to distant villages so as to access farming plots for food
crops.62 This commute has major impacts on families who have to incur travel costs,
wasted time in travel, and lost opportunities to take care of their children. As a mother
of three children stated
when my husband and I temporarily move to our rice farm in Signali Village, far from
Msolwa Village, we either move along with our kids or leave them with relatives in
Msolwa Village. If we move with them, they will have to miss schools, but if we leave
them with relatives, they sometimes do not go to school or miss proper parenting, but we
have no more alternatives, over the past two years we keep using both options.63
Some previous studies in Kilombero Valley have also reported that school dropouts and
teenage pregnancies are on the increase in the area.64
The lack of land for food production affects family members differently. For example,
women focus on producing food for family consumption and some extra for sale, while
men dominate sugarcane production and its related businesses.65 But the increasing scar-
city of land creates new relations and power dynamics around ownership among large-
scale sugarcane growers and poor outgrowers who are squeezed out.66 Field observations
show that rich farmers are able to combine sugarcane production with other activities,
including running bars, restaurants and guest houses in the area. However, outgrowers
in general have very limited involvement in trade, distribution and marketing of final
sugar products, as downstream activities are controlled by the company, while distribution
of sugar is also carried out by few traders, mostly with foreign origins.67
Local political responses
For years, communities living around KSCL have engaged in farming sugarcane and other
crops.68 Immediately after it took control of the company, the Illovo Group wanted to
reclaim all the land registered in its lease from the government. The company also
wanted to expand its sugarcane plantations.69 However, company plans were halted not
only by the area’s mountainous features, but by smallholders’ unwillingness to give up
their land for the company’s plantation.70
Even when the company attempted to open up new plantations in two distant villages
(Ruipa and Mpofu), especially in the former land owned by the Sugar Board of Tanzania
(SBT), villagers were not ready to give up on their land.71 Although the government
claimed that villagers had invaded the land, villagers took the matter to the courts,
where they won the case because SBT had never developed the land.72 The court found
that they only need to vacate the land if they are paid full compensation. However,
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instead of compensating communities, SBT decided to incorporate communities as out-
growers whenever sugarcane production takes place in the area.73
The actions of villagers resisting the expansion of the company into their land, and out-
growers’ questioning of the company’s lack of transparency and their terms of incorpor-
ation need to be located within an understanding of the broader political economy.
Kilombero Valley, as one of the central areas of SAGCOT, has attracted the attention
of civil society organisations (CSOs) and academics working on land and natural resources
rights. Land in these areas is increasingly central to political mobilisation and resistance
among villagers and it is often used as a central campaign theme. For example, addressing
the public in front of President John Magufuli in Kilombero, the Member of Parliament
for Kilombero Constituency, Peter Lijualikali, urged the President to give back underde-
veloped lands currently held by investors.74 He complained that, while investors hoard
such lands, his constituency members are left without land.75 On their part, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) working on land rights have also increased their presence
within SAGCOT area, raising awareness around land and resource rights among villagers.
As one of the NGO representatives highlighted:
Our role as a land rights NGO is to ensure people are aware of their rights and risks associ-
ated with the development driven state-capital alliance initiatives like SAGCOT. After edu-
cating people, we leave them to decide on their own, and we see the impact of our
engagement as people are resisting investments they believe marginalises them.76
In addition, the company’s attempt to expand its estate was resisted by smallholders,
whose struggles are supported by CSOs and politicians. Local villagers are incorporated
into an expanding outgrower scheme, but with differentiated impacts. Some, especially
those with land, benefit from a new relationship with the company, and are able to
develop business opportunities around sugarcane cutting, loading and transportation
from farm fields to factories.77 But others must balance new engagements as outgrowers
with food growing, in the context of less and less land.78 Therefore, as the company con-
tinues to mobilise more farmers to join outgrowing schemes, the contestation between
local interests and the company has become more complex.
In the context of a changing political dynamic around corridor-making, land access
remains a key issue, and local discontent continues among poorer families whose grie-
vances are increasingly articulated by CSOs. Thus, the investment – focusing more on a
plantation approach, involving locals as labourers – has evolved through these processes
of contestation to one that includes outgrowing and selective incorporation of small-
holders into the company enterprise.79 The resulting differentiation has led to success
for some, while the losers must seek new land for food growing elsewhere.80
Mkulazi Holding Company Limited (MHCL)
The second case focuses on the Mkulazi Holding Company Limited (MHCL), which was
founded and run by two state-owned pension funds, and aims to produce sugarcane on
state-owned prison farms. The company was officially inaugurated by the Tanzanian
Prime Minister Kassim Majaliwa on 4 September 2017.81 Although the facility is still
under construction, it initially planned to plant and manage sugarcane production on
38,000 ha and a complementary area of 3,000 ha was to be used by cane outgrowers
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from neighbouring villages.82 All outgrowers’ cane will be used by the MHCL. The
company plans to use the remaining area of 20,000 ha to grow a variety of crops,
mainly sorghum, paddy and sunflower. Overall, the project will depend not only on rain-
water, but on irrigation, using the Ruvu and Ngerengere rivers for dam construction in the
area.83
Despite the strong political support the project enjoys to date, as well as the potential
financial boost, as of December 2018 sugarcane was planted on only 1,000 ha, out of
38,000 ha. This had been planted by a combination of many outgrowers surrounding
the factory. The company is slowly constructing sugar processing factories, expanding
sugarcane estate areas and initiating outgrowing schemes in Mbigiri Area (Mkulazi II).
However, in the farmland area of Ngerengere (Mkulazi I) no work has begun.84 A
senior official of the company explained in an interview that they have not made much
progress in the area due to lack of key infrastructure, such as roads and bridges. He
elaborated:
Although we want to stand up on our own, financing infrastructure for a large investment
like ours is expensive. We know even successful companies like Kilombero Sugar
Company Limited got support to build infrastructure. European Union funds the mainten-
ance of roads within the sugar producing areas of Kilombero. Tanganyika Planting Company
– a sugarcane company based in Moshi uses railways within its sugarcane estates for
transportation.
Due to these realities and potential bureaucractic delays, at the time of writing, only farm
boundaries and the clearing of roads were completed in Mkulazi I or Ngerengere area.85
Although the company is primarily using land owned by the Tanzanian Prison Services
set aside since 1975, the land lacks clear boundaries and three subvillages have been estab-
lished within what has been deemed general land. Interviewed villagers in two subvillages
of Tungi and Kizanda explained that, although they were not resisting the government
ownership claims, since they relocated to occupy the empty area over 12 years ago, they
had never seen any boundaries and some of them were allocated land by the village gov-
ernment. These residents’ claims are acknowledged by local authorities. For example,
according to Mkulazi Ward Executive Officer,86 people who reside in and use the land
for 12 consecutive years will be compensated. However, until August 2018, there was
no evaluation carried out to determine such compensation. Indeed, authorities do not
give much room for communities to claim their rights over this land, but villagers may
have a claim since the land was not properly demarcated and, as noted elsewhere in the
country, villagers are often negatively affected by developmental projects like this.87
This situation has become a source of contestation between the authorities and villagers,
who have occupied the land for some time and so demand their rights to compensation
and resettlement.88
Land relations, processes of local land privatisation and local responses
As a result of these investments, land around Mkulazi I and II is becoming scarce and
expensive. Most land around Mkulazi II, for instance, has been acquired by urban elites
from as far as Dar Es Salaam or those with large sugar farms in Kilombero valley.89 In
Mvomero District, most land is owned by ‘absentee landlords’ and some of these landlords
are connected to the ruling elites and or former senior officials.90 Pastoral communities
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around these investment areas are also concerned that further expansion of sugarcane pro-
duction in the area, without taking into consideration livestock pastures and migratory
routes, will negatively affect their livelihoods.91
District officials and communities in Mvomero have some legal misconceptions and
conflicting priorities. For example, while district officials have insisted on individual titling
among pastoralist communities as the solution to land-based conflicts, pastoralists want rec-
ognition of communal lands.92 Unfortunately, pastoral communities’ resistance to individual
titles is interpreted by district officials as resistance to village land use planning.93 District
officers stressed that, because village land use planning was a participatory process, most
decisions that lead to such plans are made at the village general assemblies dominated by
farming communities. For a variety of reasons, such as participating in livestock markets
or taking livestock to grazing areas, pastoralist communities have difficulty attending
village assemblies94, which approve village land use plans. They are thus denied opportunities
to identify their grazing lands and routes including ways to access water. However, pastoral
communities have initiated several fora to ensure their complaints are heard.95 They are at
the forefront of ensuring that peace committees, established from the village to the regional
level, are functioning and that these committees have their own constitutions.96
Unlike Kilombero, the MHCL is a new company that aims to develop a sugar business
on state land. It has found it difficult to establish its operations quickly because of
inadequate financing and technology, as well as poor infrastructure. While notionally
unused state land, the land earmarked for the estate was being used by local farmers
and pastoralists. Farmers had long been using the land and resented eviction.97 Mean-
while, pastoralists make use of land for grazing and migration routes. The lack of involve-
ment of mobile pastoralists in village land use planning processes meant that they were
excluded from decisions. The complexity of land use rights in the area has therefore led
to contestation between the company, local farmers and pastoralists.98
Njombe Milk Factory Limited
The third case, Njombe Milk Factory Ltd., located in Njombe Town in the southern high-
lands of Tanzania was among the first five winners of the SAGCOT centre Catalytic Funds.
Unlike the previous two cases, this case is not a land extensive operation, and is focused on
milk processing in a single plant, linked to an intensive dairy farm of 33 ha. The factory is
located in SAGCOT’s priority cluster of Ihemi (see Figure 3). Registered as a limited
company, the company collects raw milk from about 1,200 dairy farmers.99 At present,
farmers are represented by their cooperative society called Njombe Livestock Farmers
Association (NJOLIFA). They receive payment every two weeks, which helps them to
make bulk purchases and/or significant investments, rather than spending the money
they previously collected from daily milk sales.100
The factory, was initially championed by Heifer International and other partners,
including Cefa, an Italian NGO, and Njombe Catholic church. Unlike the two cases
above, in which either investors and/or the government ran the business and owned the
majority of shares, Njombe factory’s major shareholder is the farmers’ cooperative
NJOLIFA (20%), followed by Granarolo (the Italian Company) (16.25%), the Catholic
Diocese of Njombe (9.75%), Njombe Town Council (9.5%), and Njombe District
Council (9.5%) respectively.101
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Land relations, market dynamics and processes of local land privatisation
The company has had a right of occupancy over its factory land since August 2017. It has
not acquired any land from communities; instead, its farm land was allocated by Njombe
District Council, the local government authority. All members of local communities sup-
plying milk to the company use their own land to graze livestock and conduct other agri-
cultural activities.102 Given the increasing milk businesses in the district, land value
around the industry is high, compared to other areas.103
Using Italian and French agricultural technologies, the company is producing fresh
milk, cheese and yoghurt. All of the company’s produce is sold in various regions of Tan-
zania, but fresh milk is mostly sold in nearby districts and regions.104 Currently, the
company has employed 49 workers – 19 women and 30 men. Both men and women
workers are employed under one-year contracts and are paid about TZS 165,000 ($73)
per month – an amount that is more than government’s minimum wage of TZS
150,000 ($66).105 However, discussion with the company’s workers revealed that they
work long hours and lack other fringe benefits and incentives, apart from annual
financial awards given to the two best-performing workers.
Local political responses
Unlike the two case studies above, Njombe milk factory does not seem to attract any sig-
nificant negative reactions from local communities, apart from complaints about its poor
sewage and waste management system.106 In terms of land rights, the lack of contestation
can be explained by the fact that the company does not pose any significant threat to com-
munities’ land and other resources.107 Also, unlike the other two cases, at the moment, the
association of milk producers is the largest shareholder in the company.
Nonetheless, despite being the majority shareholder, farmers remain price takers for the
milk they supply. This situation is also causing some farmers to side-sell their milk to Asas
Diaries Ltd. – the largest dairy company in Tanzania, based in Iringa municipality.108 The
company management has complained that there are too many regulatory bodies, which
demand different but relatively interrelated compliance, such as business permits and
annual fees.109 According to the Tanzania Confederation of Industries, the food-processing
sector must deal with about 15 regulatory bodies, which have overlapping responsibilities.110
Because Njombe Milk Factory has smallholder livestock keepers as its largest share-
holders, there seems to be few challenges of local and foreign actors operating together.
However, the long-term sustainability of the company remains unclear. Since the
largest shareholders are price takers, the business and partnerships are tricky, especially
if the offered price remains lower than prices offered by other buyers such as Asas
Dairies. Striking the balance among and between shareholders in milk production,
company management and decision-making bodies is crucial to equitable representation
of all actors with a stake in the company. Like Kilombero Sugar Company Limited, the
terms of incorporation of livestock keepers or milk producers is also the source of con-
testation in the Njombe Milk Factory.
Negotiating a corridor on the ground: compromises and shifting positions
The three cases highlight the tensions and contradictions inherent in the process of cor-
ridor-making. The first two cases – Kilombero and MHCL – are premised on land-
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extensive production, focusing in each case on sugarcane. A mix of state and international
capital combine to invest in expanding estate land, together with investments in infra-
structure including processing plants. The vision is one of large-scale commercial pro-
duction, generating employment alongside opportunities for smallholders as
outgrowers. While MHCL is yet to take off to the extent planned, Kilombero is a long-
established operation. However, both are facing challenges over acquiring land for expan-
sion, and Kilombero is shifting its expansion strategies towards incorporating more out-
growers. Despite operating on what is deemed state land, conflicting use claims by villagers
(both smallholders and pastoralists) is causing land disputes in the MHCL case, with pas-
toralist groups feeling particularly aggrieved by the decision that would see them leaving
their grazing land, without any clarity of where they could re-settle and or whether they
would be compensated.111 By contrast, the Njombe Milk Factory, because of its small land
requirement, has generated fewer conflicts and, through a mixed shareholder model, has
incorporated smallholders into the core of its operation.
In all cases, the involvement of local people is selective; for example, with local elites
benefiting in the wider commercial operation of Kilombero. Thus alliances between exter-
nal and endongenous capital become important in generating new patterns of differen-
tiation, excluding some from the benefits of corridor development, such as pastoralists
in MHCL and small-scale producers requiring land for food production in Kilombero.
Such contests, and resultant processes of differentiation, mean that the simple, grand
visions of large-scale estate farming must be adapted, with outgrower schemes in particu-
lar being a route to selective incorporation of local interests, which in turn acts to diffuse
resistance.
Such shifts are increasingly being recognised by the management of SAGCOT. For
example, the SAGCOT secretariat comprised of several staff (who lead the initiative),
has opened its operations branch in Iringa Region as part of its attempt to decentralise
its services.112 Through its small-scale farmer training programmes, the SAGCOT sec-
retariat has recruited several companies, especially those that received grants, to train
farmers. SAGCOT has also built eight storage warehouses for smallholder farmers in
three districts (four at Mbarali District, two at Iringa rural, and two at Kyela).113
With political changes at the national level since 2015, some of the big policy initiatives
that framed the modernist vision of SAGCOT previously have been abandoned. For
example, former President Kikwete’s initiative – Big Results Now, which aimed to fast-
track public and private sector delivery, especially on large-scale commercial estates or
nucleus farms for sugarcane and rice114 – has been shelved by President Magufuli.115
SAGCOT may therefore be changing its overall policy position, as it tries to negotiate
the making of a corridor in a highly contested landscape, with many competing interests.
For example, a senior SAGCOT secretariat official argued that the current leadership is
new, with a different outlook. The official explained that, unlike in the past, the current
leadership is pro-smallholders. He confirmed this change stating that ‘[s]mall-scale
farmers/smallholders can surpass large-scale farmers in some high value crops because
smallholders not only put knowledge, but love… they feel farming is part of their
life.’’116 Yet, based on the field observations and analysis highlighted above, it is unclear
whether the SAGCOT secretariat’s new outlook will fully shift from its current focus on
developing nucleus estates with outgrowers schemes towards more pro-smallholder
farming investments.
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Conclusion
As Tania Li has shown in her critique of James Scotts’ book ‘Seeing Like a State’, grand
modernist visions are not merely designed and implemented by the state. Rather, such
visions are designed, implemented and shaped by various actors, often with diverse inter-
ests. SAGCOT is a classic example of how different actors participated in corridor design
and implementation, and how the top-down SAGCOT visions, driven by state-capital alli-
ances, were reshaped through national and local resistances and contestations. Currently,
SAGCOT remains a site of contestation between state bureaucrats, donors and financial
institutions, investors and smallholder producers over land and resources rights, as well
as over directions and terms of incorporation in agricultural commercialisation. The
grand modernist vision of the corridor, centred on the promotion of large-scale estates,
has unravelled through contestations and negotations on the ground. But, as the
different cases show, such unravelling happens in different ways. Smallholders living
near the two estates, for example, aim to ensure that they remain producers, rather
than labourers on the estates, while smallholder milk producers have become shareholders
in the Njombe milk factory.
As the cases show, understanding land rights is a key factor in enabling and/or con-
straining any land-based investment. Hence, despite the strong political support and sig-
nificant financial backing SAGCOT received from the previous government, it has yet to
achieve its ambitious plans of establishing large-scale estates with outgrowing schemes
across the corridor.
The lack of available land is a key challenge for SAGCOT. As the case of Kilombero
Sugar Company Limited has shown, most of the targeted land is village land, with land
users objecting to the expansion of estates, and mobilising opposition.117 As an official
from the Sugar Board of Tanzania explained, government’s plans to offer land for sugar-
cane estate development had to be abandoned because villagers not only resisted, but took
court action to reverse government and investors’ plans. The implementation of SAGCOT
has thus revealed tensions between the local politics of resource use, control and owner-
ship on the one hand, and state-capital alliances on the other.
But there have been shifts in position, and adaptations of strategy over time. SAGCOT’s
initial focus of establishing large-scale plantations did not materialise because of the
difficulties in accessing village land. Coupled with local contestation and then growing
opposition in the area, new investors are shifting their focus from enclave estates to small-
holder outgrower schemes. As the Kilombero case shows, the shift towards the nucleus-
outgrower model provides opportunities for rich and well-connected farmers to benefit,
but the terms of incorporation in these investments are contested, limited and differen-
tiated. As a result, the impact of partnerships between outgrowers and large-scale pro-
cessors are highly differentiated, including on gender lines, with only a few low quality
jobs on offer at the plantations and few of these jobs going to women.118
Given the poor policy, legal and institutional frameworks governing nucleus-outgrower
schemes and large-scale land-based investments, such investments are likely to benefit
investors and elites, and may have significant negative implications for marginalised
land users such as pastoralists and poor outgrowers.119 As the cases show, the change
from enclave estates120 to outgrowing121 is not accidental; rather it reflects embedded
class interests and has significant consequences for gender dynamics, equity and
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livelihoods. Yet, the focus on establishing large-scale estates and a combination of nucleus
estates and outgrowers in the SAGCOT region remains. It is in the interest of local and
national elites to welcome large-scale initiatives promoted by foreign and national
capital because they create opportunities for rent-seeking and direct benefits through
lease agreements and/or directly accumulating land.122 However, given the ongoing pol-
itical and civic transformation at local and national levels, these plans will continue to
be challenged by local communities concerned about their land and resource rights.
The SAGCOT case thus not only contributes to wider debates about resistance to and
incorporation in agricultural investments,123 but also to an understanding of corridor-
making as a contested political process, and how grand modernist visions124 are designed
and implemented by various actors, often with diverse interests,125 and are so reshaped
through local agency and contested negotiations on the ground. Future studies need not
only to perceive and understand corridor as an investment in a geographical area, but
rather a political construct that is subject to wider political circumstances, internationally,
nationally and locally.
Notes
1. Smalley, “Agricultural growth Corridors”; Gálvez Nogales and Webber, Territorial tools;
Dannenberg et al., “Spaces for Integration”.
2. Gálvez Nogales and Webber, Territorial tools; Dannenberg et al., “Spaces for Integration”.
3. See New Alliance Progress Report, http://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/
072814_NewAlliance_FinalC_508.pdf [Accessed 13 February 2019].
4. Sulle, “Land grabbing”; Sulle and Hall, “Reframing the New Alliance”.
5. Approved in 2003 by heads of states and governments, CAADP’s main objective is to ensure
each African country allocates at least 10% of its total budget to agriculture.
6. See Scott, Seeing Like a State.
7. Sulle, “Land Grabbing”; Chinsinga and Chasukwa, The Great Belt Initiative; Hall, “Land
Grabbing in Southern Africa”.
8. Hall et al “Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation?”, McAdam et al., Dynamics of Conten-
tion; Hickey, “The Politics of Staying Poor”.
9. Bernstein, Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change, 22.
10. See Hansen and Stepputat, States of Imagination; Tsing, An Ethnography of Global
Connection.
11. Sulle, “Land Grabbing”; Sulle and Smalley, The Role of the State; Massimba et al., Consultancy
Services.
12. See Smalley, “Agricultural growth Corridors”.
13. Scott, Seeing Like a State.
14. Coulson, Political Economy of Tanzania.
15. Bergius, “Expanding the Corporate”; Twomey et al., “Impact of Large-scale”.
16. Scott, Seeing Like a State; Li, “Beyond ‘the state’ and Failed Schemes”.
17. URT, Development Vision 2025; Khalifa Said and Ephrahim Bahemu, “President Magufuli
out to leave mega projects legacy”, The Citizen, 6 November 2018, https://www.thecitizen.
co.tz/News/President-Magufuli-out-to-leave-mega-projects-legacy/1840340-4838814-
3kiq94z/index.html [Accessed 2 February 2019].
18. Scott, Seeing Like a State; Li, “Beyond ‘the state’ and Failed Schemes”.
19. SAGCOT Investment Partnership Program: Opportunities for Investors in the Sugar Sector,
2012. www.sagcot.com.
20. Paul and Steinbrecher, “African Agricultural growth Corridor”.
21. Paul and Steinbrecher, “African Agricultural growth Corridor”; Laltaika, “Business and
Human Rights”.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 347
22. See http://www.sagcot.com/ [Accessed 11 December 2018].
23. Bergius, “Expanding the Corporate Food Regime”.
24. Village land means land within the boundaries of a village registered in accordance with the
Local Government Act of 1982 administered through Village Land Act No 5 of 1999.
25. See https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/industrialisation [Accessed 2 February 2019]; Said and
Bahemu, “President Magufuli”, op. cit.
26. Rosemary Mirondo, “Tanzania Government Cancels Sh100bn Sagcot Scheme.” The Citizen
May 17, 2019, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Tanzania-government-cancels-Sh100bn-
Sagcot-scheme/1840340-5119582-qvi1siz/index.html; Africa Confidential, “Farming
Gamble Fails.” 22 March 2019. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12602/
Farming_gamble_fails
27. SAGCOT Catalytic Trust Fund, “Govt to Redraft Stalled SAGCOT Scheme.” July 19, 2019,
https://sagcotctf.co.tz/2019/07/19/govt-to-redraft-stalled-sagcot-scheme-2/ [Accessed 21
January 2020].
28. Brunnermeier, “Deciphering the liquidity”
29. Bergius et al., “Green economy”; Ouma, “From Financialization to Operations of Capital”
30. Browne, “The History and Politics”.
31. See Gonçalves, “Beira and Nacala”.
32. See AgDevCo and Prorustica, cited in Maganga et al., “Dispossession through Formaliza-
tion”, 16.
33. Sulle, “Biofuels Boom and Bust”; Vermeulen and Cotula; Making the Most of Agricultural
Investment.
34. Twomey et al., “Impacts of large-scale”; Massay and Kassile ‘Land-based Investments’; Belair,
“Land Investments in Tanzania”
35. Hall, “The Next Great Trek”; Cotula and Leonard, Alternatives to Land Grabbing.
36. Sulle, “Land Grabbing”.
37. URT, National Agriculture Policy, 8.
38. Maganga et al., “Dispossession through Formalization”.
39. See http://sagcot.co.tz/index.php/sagcot-investment-project/#1532685674247-2ea69550-8ffc
[Accessed 15 November 2018].




advertisement-call-for-business-concept-proposals/ [Accessed 4 August 2017].
43. See West and Haug. “Polarised Narratives and Complex Realities”; World Bank, “New
Project to Link Farmers to Agribusiness in Tanzania.” Press Release, March 10, 2016,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/03/10/new-project-to-link-farmers-
to-agribusiness-in-tanzania [Accessed 5 August 2017].
44. Africa Confidential, “Farming Gamble Fails”, op. cit.
45. Dannenberg et al, “Spaces for Integration”.
46. SAGCOT, “Southern Agricultural Corridor,” 17.
47. Hall et al., “Resistance, acquiescence or incorporation?”McAdam et al., Dynamics of Conten-
tion; Hickey, “The Politics of Staying Poor”.
48. SAGCOT Investment Partnership, 17; Smalley et al., “The Role of the State”.
49. Discussion with SAGCOT official, Dar Es Salaam, 6 May 2018.
50. URT, Development Vision; Nshala and Locke, “A proposed Land for Equity Scheme”.
51. Baum, “Land use in Kilombero Valley”; Smalley and Sulle, “The State and Foreign Capital”.
52. See https://www.illovosugarafrica.com/About-us/Group-Overview/Structure [Accessed 2
February 2019].
53. Illovo Sugar Ltd, “Integrated Report 2013.” www.illovosugar.co.za/Financial/Annual_
Reports/Annual_Report2013.aspx [Accessed 20 September 2018].
54. Ibid.
55. Personal communication with the cane growers association official, 1 February 2019.
348 E. SULLE
56. see Sprenger, Sugarcane Outgrowers; Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”.
57. Focus group discussion, members of Msolwa outgrowers association, 14 May 2018.
58. Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”.
59. see Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”; Sulle, “Social Differentiation”.
60. Dancer and Sulle, “Gender Implications”; Hall et al., “Plantations, Outgrowers and Commer-
cial Farming in Africa”.
61. Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”.
62. Ibid; Dancer and Sulle, Gender Implications.
63. Interview, a mother of three children, Msolwa Ujamaa Village, 15 May 2018.
64. Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”; Nombo, “Sweet Cane, Bitter Realities”;
Dancer and Sulle, Gender Implications.
65. Dancer and Sulle, Gender Implications.
66. Ibid.
67. Massimba et al., Consultancy Services; Sulle, “Social Differentiation”.
68. Baum, “Land use in Kilombero Valley”;
69. Chachage, “Kilombero Sugar”; Locher and Sulle, “Challenges and Methodological Flaws”.
70. Mbilinyi and Semkafu, “Gender and Employment”; Sulle and Smalley, “The State and
Foreign Capital”
71. Bergius, “Expanding the Corporate Food Regime”
72. Interview with Sugar Board of Tanzania official, Dar Es Salaam, 19 October 2017.
73. Ibid.
74. Mwananchi Newspaper, “Wabunge wa upinzani wamwaga kero zao mbele ya Magufuli”, 5
May 2018.
75. Ibid.
76. Interview with land rights NGO representative, Dar Es Salaam, 10 May 2018.
77. See Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”.
78. See Ibid.
79. Milgoom, “Policy Processes of a Land Grab”; Hall et al., “Resistance, Acquiescence or
Incorporation?”
80. Sulle and Smalley, “The State and Foreign Capital”.
81. The Guardian, “Mkulazi sugar project to end country’s sugar deficit – minister”, 10 Decem-
ber 2018. https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/mkulazi-sugar-project-end-country%E2%
80%99s-sugar-deficit-minister [Accessed 2 January 2019].
82. Institute for Resource Assessment (University of Dar es Salaam), “Environmental and social
impact assessment report for the proposed Mkulazi sugar farming and processing factory,
Morogoro Rural District, Morogoro Region, Tanzania”. Unpublished, 12 October 2017.
83. Ibid.
84. Interview, Mkulazi Ward Executive Officer, Mkulazi 7 September 2018.
85. Ibid.
86. In Tanzania a ward is an administrative unit formed by more than one village, while a village
itself is formed by more than one subvillage.
87. Mwami and Kamata, Land Grabbing in a Post-Investment Period.
88. Focus group discussion, residents in Kizada subvillage, 7 September 2018.
89. Interview, former official, Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association, Mikumi, 14 May 2018.
90. Chachage and Mbunda, The state of the then NAFCO.
91. Interview with pastoralist NGO representative, Morogoro, 14 May 2018.
92. Ibid.
93. Interview, district land official, Mvomero District, 27 July 2018.
94. Interview, district livestock officer, Mvomero District, 30 July 2018.
95. Interview with pastoralist NGO representative, Morogoro, 14 May 2018.
96. Ibid.
97. Focus group discussion, residents in Kizada subvillage, 7 September 2018.
98. Ibid.
99. Interview, company’s manager, Njombe, 31 August 2018.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 349
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Interview, NJOLIFA member, Njombe, 31 August 2018.
103. Interview, company’s manager, Njombe, 31 August 2018.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Interview, NJOLIFA member, Njombe, 31 August 2019.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Interview, company’s manager, Njombe, 31 August 2018.
110. Tanzania Daily News, “Tanzania: CTI Says Too Many Regulatory Bodies Are Counterpro-
ductive.” May 30, 2016. https://allafrica.com/stories/201605310607.html [Accessed 12
March 2019].
111. Interview Executive Ward Office, Mkulazi, 31 August 2018.
112. Discussion with SAGCOT official, Dar Es Salaam, 06 May 2018.
113. Policy Forum. “Position Statement Budget 2016/07.” http://www.policyforum-tz.org/
position-statement-budget-20162017 [Accessed 14 September 2018].
114. URT, Development Vision 2025.
115. The Citizen Newspaper, “Unanswered Questions as BRN Disbanded.” 28 June 2017. https://
www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Unanswered-questions-as-BRN-disbanded/1840340-3990386-
11n2ibbz/index.html [Accessed 21 January 2020].
116. Interview with SAGCOT staff, Masaki, 11 August 2017.
117. Boaudreax, “An Assessment of Concerns Related to Land Tenure”.
118. Dancer and Sulle, “Gender implications”.
119. Shivji, Accumulation in an African Periphery
120. Ferguson, “Seeing Like an Oil Company”.
121. Sprenger, Sugarcane Outgrowers.
122. Sulle, “Land Grabbing”; Hall “Land Grabbing in Southern Africa”.
123. Hall et al “Resistance, acquiescence or incorporation?”.
124. Jame Scott, Seeing Like a State.
125. Li, “Beyond “The State” Failed Schemes”.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Peter Kitua and Happiness Joseph for their research assistance and to Ian Scoones,
Ngala Chome, Ruth Hall, Jeremy Lind, Rebecca Pointer, Euclides Gonçalves and two anonymous
reviewers for their critical comments and insights on the earlier drafts of this article. I am thankful
to John Hall for creating the maps. The Agricultural Policy Research in Africa programme of the
Future Agricultures Consortium supported by the Department for International Deveopment, UK
and based at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, funded
the research work for this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
The Agricultural Policy Research in Africa programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium sup-
ported by the Department for International Deveopment, UK and based at the Institute for Devel-
opment Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, funded the research work for this article.
350 E. SULLE
Bibliography
Baum, Eckhard. “Land use in the Kilombero Valley: From Shifting Cultivation Towards Permanent
Farming.” In Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania: Ten Case Studies,
edited by Ruthenberg Hans, 21–50. Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1968.
Belair, Joanny. “Land Investments in Tanzania: Assessing the Role of State Brokers.” Journal of
Modern African Studies 56, no. 3 (2018): 371–394.
Bergius, Mikael. “Expanding the Corporate Food Regime: The Southern Agricultural Growth
Corridor of Tanzania. Current and Potential Implications for Rural Households.” Master’s
Thesis, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Oslo, 2014.
Bergius, Mikael. “Expanding The Corporate Food Regime In Africa Through Agricultural Growth
Corridors: The Case Of Tanzania.” Draft. Paper for Colloquium on Global Governance/Politics,
Climate Justice andAgrarian/Social Justice: Linkages andChallenges, 4-5February 2016,TheHague.
Bergius, Mikael, Tor Benjaminsen, and Mats Widgren. “Green Economy, Scandinavian
Investments and Agricultural Modernization in Tanzania.” Journal of Peasant Studies (2017).
doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1260554.
Bernstein, Henry. Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change. Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2010.
Boudreaux, Karol. “An Assessment of Concerns Related to Land Tenure in the SAGCOT Region
For USAID/Tanzania.” 9–20 April 2012.
Browne, Adriane. LAPSSET: The History and Politics of an Eastern African Megaproject. London:
Rift Valley Institute, 2014.
Brunnermeier, Markus. “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08.” National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 14612. Cambridge: NBER, 2010.
Chachage, Chambi. “Kilombero Sugar Company/Illovo: Economically Sabotaged?” Udadisi blog, 24
January 2012. Accessed September 23, 2018. http://udadisi.blogspot.com/2012/01/kilombero-
sugar-companyillovo.html..
Chachage, Chambi, and Richard Mbunda. The State of the Then NAFCO, NARCO and Absentee
Landlords’ Farms/Ranches in Tanzania. Dar Es Salaam: Land Rights Research and Resource
Institute (LARRRI/HAKIARDHI), 2009.
Chinsinga, Blessing, and Michael Chasukwa. The Green Belt Initiative and Land Grabs in Malawi,
Policy Brief 55, Future Agricultures Consortium, Brighton, 2012.
Cotula, Lorenzo, and Rebeca Leonard. Alternative to Land Acquisitions: Agricultural Investment
and Collaborative Business Models. London: IIED, 2010.
Coulson, Andrew. Tanzania: A Political Economy. First and Second edition. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982 and 2015.
Dancer, Helen, and Emmanuel Sulle. “Gender Implications of Agricultural Commercialisation: The
Case of Sugarcane Production in Kilombero District, Tanzania.” Future Agricultures Consortium
Working Paper 118. FAC: Brighton, 2015.
Dannenberg, Peter, Revilla Diez, and Daniel Schiller. “Spaces for Integration or a Divide? New-
Generation Growth Corridors and Their Integration in Global Value Chains in the Global
South.” Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie (2018). doi:0.1515/zfw-2017-0034.
Ferguson, James. “Seeing Like an oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal
Africa.” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2005): 377–382.
Gálvez Nogales, Eva, and Martin Webber, eds. Territorial Tools for Agro-Industry Development: A
Sourcebook. Rome: FAO, 2015.
Gonçalves, Euclides. “Agricultural Corridors as ‘Demonstration Fields’: Infrastructure, Fairs and
Associations Along the Beira and Nacala Corridors of Mozambique.” Journal of Eastern
African Studies 14 (2020): 2.
Hall, Ruth. “Land Grabbing in Southern Africa: the Many Faces of the Investor Rush.” Review of
African Political Economy 38, no. 18 (2011): 193–214.
Hall, Ruth. “The Next Great Trek? South African Commercial Farmers Move North.” Journal of
Peasant Studies 39, no. 3-4 (2012): 823–843.
Hall, Ruth, Marc Edelman, Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ian Scoones, Ben White, and Wendy Wolford.
“Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation? An Introduction to Land Grabbing and Political
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 351
Reactions ‘From Below’.” Journal of Peasant Studies 42, no. 3-4 (2015): 467–488. doi:10.1080/
03066150.2015.1036746.
Hall, Ruth, Ian Scoones, and Tsikata Dzodzi. “Plantations, Outgrowers and Commercial Farming in
Africa: Agricultural Commercialisation and Implications for Agrarian Change.” Journal of
Peasant Studies 44, no. 3 (2017): 515–537.
Hansen, Thomas Blom and Finn Stepputat, eds. States of Imagination. Ethnographic Explorations of
the Postcolonial State, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2001.
Hickey, Sam. “The Politics of Staying Poor: Exploring the Political Space for Poverty Reduction in
Uganda.” World Development 33, no. 6 (2005): 995–1009.
Laltaika, Elifuraha. “Business and Human Rights in Tanzania: Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences
with Access to Justice and Remedies.” In Business and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples’
Experiences with Access to Remedy Case Studies from Africa, Asia and Latin America,
Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), edited by C. Doyle, 211–232. Chiang Mai, ALMÁCIGA:
Madrid; Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2015.
Li, Tania. “Beyond “The State” and Failed Schemes.” American Anthropologist 107, no. 3 (2005):
383–394.
Locher, Martina, and Emmanuel Sulle. “Challenges andMethodological Flaws in Reporting the Global
Land Rush: Observations from Tanzania.” Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 4 (2014): 569–592.
Maganga, Faustin, Kelly Askew, Rie Odgaard, and Howard Stein. “Dispossession through
Formalization: Tanzania and the G8 Land Agenda in Africa.” Asian Journal of African Studies
40 (2016): 3–49.
Massay, Godfrey, and Kassile Telemu. “Land-based Investments in Tanzania: Legal Framework and
Realities on the Ground.” Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI) Working Paper 56. LDPI: Cape
Town, 2011.
Massimba Joseph, Charles Malaki, and Betty Waized. Consultancy Services for Collecting Policy
Based Evidence for Enhancing Sugar Industry Regulatory Framework of Tanzania. Morogoro:
SUGECO, 2013.
Mbilinyi, M., and A. M. Semakafu. “Gender and Employment on Sugar Cane Plantations in
Tanzania.” Sectoral and Working Discussion Papers, Agriculture, SAP 2.44/WP.85.
International Labour Organization: Geneva, 1995.
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Mwami, Abunuwasi, and Ng’wanza Kamata. Land Grabbing in a Post-Investment Period and
Popular Reaction in the Rufiji River Basin. Research report for Haki Ardhi, (2011). http://
farmlandgrab.org/post/view/20864.
Nombo, Carolyne. “Sweet Cane, Bitter Realities: The Complex Realities of AIDS in Mkamba,
Kilombero District, Tanzania.” In AIDS and Rural Livelihoods, edited by A. Niehof, G.
Rugalema, and S. Gillespie, 61–76. London: Earthscan, 2010.
Nshala, Rugemeleza, and Anna Locke. “A Proposed Land for Equity Scheme in Tanzania: Issues
and Assistance.” ODI Discussion Paper. Overseas Development Institute: London, 2013.
Ouma, Stefan. “From Financialization to Operations of Capital: Historicizing and Disentangling the
Finance–Farmland-Nexus.” Geoforum; Journal of Physical, Human, and Regional Geosciences 72
(2016): 82–93.
Paul, Helena, and Ricarda Steinbrecher. “African Agricultural Growth Corridor and the New
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: Who Benefits, Who Looses?” Econexus Report.
Econexus: Oxford, 2013.
Scott, James. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
Shivji, Issa. Accumulation in an African Periphery: A Theoretical Framework. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki
na Nyota Publishers Ltd, 2009.
Smalley, Rebecca. “Agricultural growth Corridors on the Eastern Seaboard of Africa: An Overview.
Future Agricultures/APRA Working Paper 1. IDS: Brighton, 2017.
Sprenger, E. L. M. Sugarcane Outgrowers and Kilombero Sugar Company in Tanzania. Third World
Centre: Nijmegen, 1989.
352 E. SULLE
Sulle, Emmanuel. “The Biofuels Boom and Bust in Africa: A Timely Lesson for the New Alliance
Initiative.” Future Agricultures Consortium and PLAAS Policy Brief 80. FAC and PLAAS:
Brighton, 2015.
Sulle, Emmanuel. “Land Grabbing and Commercialization Duality: Insights From Tanzania’s
Agricultural Transformation Agenda.” Afriche e Orienti (Italian Journal on African and
Middle Eastern Studies) 17, no. 3 (2016): 109–128.
Sulle, Emmanuel. “Social Differentiation and the Politics of Land: Sugar Cane Outgrowing in
Kilombero, Tanzania.” Journal of Southern African Studies 43, no. 3 (2017): 517–533. doi:10.
1080/03057070.2016.1215171.
Sulle, Emmanuel, and Ruth Hall. “Reframing the New Alliance Agenda: A Critical Assessment
based on Insights from Tanzania.” FAC and PLAAS Policy Brief 56. PLAAS and FAC:
Brighton, 2013.
Sulle, Emmanuel, and Rebecca Smalley. “The State and Foreign Capital in Agricultural
Commercialization in Tanzania: The Case of Kilombero Sugar Company.” In Africa’s Land
Rush: Rural Livelihoods and Agrarian Change, edited by Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones, and Dzodzi
Tsikata, 114–131. Woodbridge: James Currey.
Tsing, A. Lowenhaupt. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2005.
Twomey Hannah, Christina Schiavoni, and Benedict Mongula. “Impacts of Large-Scale
Agricultural Investments on Small-Scale Farmers in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania.” A
Right to Food Perspective. Bischöfliches Hilfswerk MISEREOR: Aachen (2015).
United Republic of Tanzania (URT). National Agriculture Policy. Dar es Salaam: Ministry of
Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, 2013.
United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania Development, Vision 2025, Big Results Now: National Key
Result Area. Dar es Salaam: Agriculture Lab, 2013.
Vermeulen, Sonja, and Lorenzo Cotula. Making the Most of Agricultural Investment: A Survey of
Business Models That Provide Opportunities for Smallholders. London & Rome: IIED, SDC,
IFAD & FAO, 2010.
West, Jennifer, and Ruth Haug. “Polarised Narratives and Complex Realities in Tanzania’s
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor.” Development in Practice 27, no. 4 (2017): 418–431.
doi:10.1080/09614524.2017.1307324.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 353
